

Investors' Perspectives on the Expansion of Renewable Energy Sources in Chile's Electricity Auctions

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Presentation Outline

- Introduction & A little bit of history
- Early auctions, the transition & new auctions
- Research objectives & Methodology
- Results
- Discussion



- Chile pioneered the deregulation of the electricity sector in 1982, establishing a market in generation and monopolies in transmission & distribution.
 - A spot price market was set up for the transactions among generators
 - Discos purchased energy at "bus price", calculated by the government every six months.
 - The bus price was supposed to reflect an average of the spot price in time.



- Spot Market
- Long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs)
 In Chile, PPAs can be obtained:
 - bilateral negotiations for non-regulated consumers
 based on freely defined conditions.
 - through the energy auctions for regulated consumers



- Auctions have become an effective procurement method for the expansion of renewable energy technologies in many countries.
- The number of countries using auctions to contract renewable energy capacity increased from 5 in 2005 to more than 67 in 2017, with a total capacity of 137 GW (Kruger et al. 2018).
- The adoption of renewable energies in South America, particularly in Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru has been driven primarily by the implementation of renewable energy auctions



- In 2005, the government established auctions as the mechanism to assign the long term supply of energy and capacity to distribution companies.
- The initial design of Chilean energy auctions aimed at ensuring security of supply for the regulated market



Early Auctions

Between 2006 & 2015 the results of the auction processed were not promising

| | J | 0 | Auctioned | Awarded | Awarded | |
|-----------|----------|----------|--------------|--------------|------------|--|
| Process | (\$/MWh) | (\$/MWh) | Energy (GWh) | Energy (GWh) | Percentage | |
| 2006/01 | 52,91 | 62,69 | 13568 | 12076 | 89% | |
| 2006/01-2 | 54,55 | 62,69 | 1130 | 1130 | 100% | |
| 2006/02 | 59,77 | 61,68 | 14615 | 5700 | 39% | |
| 2006/02-2 | 65,8 | 71,06 | 9000 | 1800 | 20% | |
| 2008/01 | 104,31 | 125,16 | 8788 | 7821 | 89% | |
| 2008/01-2 | 99,49 | 125,16 | 935 | 935 | 100% | |
| 2010/01 | 90,3 | 92,04 | 2696 | 2200 | 82% | |
| 2012/01 | 129,45 | 129,5 | 924 | 924 | 100% | |
| 2012/01-2 | 138,9 | 140 | 1650 | 248 | 15% | |
| 2013/01 | 128,93 | 129 | 5000 | 3900 | 78% | |
| Total | | | 58306 | 36733 | 63% | |

Early Auctions



- Between 2006 & 2015 the results of the auction processed were not promising
 - 94% of the energy was awarded to the 3 main incumbent companies (Endesa, Colbún & AES Gener) and a 5% to Campanario, that never operated.
 - As of 2013, Chile has one of the highest energy prices in Latin America and the second highest among mining countries worldwide
 - Although renewable generators were not explicitly excluded, the regime of supply forced them out in practical terms (24-hour supply). In the period of 2005-2014, renewable energies accounted for only 4% of awarded energy in all the auctions.



The Transition

- As a results, the government undertook a reform of the auction system looking to:
 - Add new generation companies
 - Increase competition
 - Lower energy prices
 - Diversity the energy matrix



New Auctions

 In the 2016 auction, the energy offered was 7 times the awards; 22 winning bids out of 84; 2/3 of the awards went to wind and solar technologies; from incumbents only Endesa is awarded; other incumbents get nothing.

| Companies | Country | Awards (GWh) | | |
|--------------|-------------|--------------|--|--|
| Mainstream | Ireland | 3366 | | |
| Endesa | Italy/Spain | 5918 | | |
| WPD | Germany | 786.8 | | |
| Ibereólica | Spain | 1034.8 | | |
| Acciona | Spain | 506 | | |
| Opde | Spain | 176 | | |
| Cox Energy | Spain | 264 | | |
| Solarpack | Spain | 280 | | |
| Besalco | Chile | 10.4 | | |
| Aela Energía | Chile | 88 | | |
| Total | | 12430 | | |

New Auctions



- Auction prices have declined by 75% from the average price of USD 130/MWh in 2012, reaching the average price of USD 35/MWh in 2017
- Solar PV technology set a record -low bid at \$US 21.48/MWh





Research Objetives

- Identify the factors that caused the change from a deficient auction system to a highly successful one
 - to identify, among all the factors, which are the most relevant in the decision from projects to participate in the auctions


Methodology



- The proposed methodology is a Multi-Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM) tool a hybrid AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process), Goal Programing (GP) that evaluates which factors have the highest influence for auction participants.
- Multi-criteria decision-making methods is a branch of operations research models that is appropriate for addressing multi-objective complex problems containing high uncertainty, conflicting objectives, different forms of data and information, and multi interests and perspectives.
- AHP technique allows the decision makers to incorporate both quantitative and qualitative judgments into a decision problem
- While the Goal Programing is GP is a mathematical programming optimization method and is more sophisticated way to rank and prioritize the alternatives.


Methodology diagram





Methodology





Survey



- The survey's goal is to obtain experts opinion from industry leaders and generation companies of each factor's relevance
- The number of answers in of the surveys is 17, where each response is technology specific

| Scale | Definition | Explanation | SURVEY RESPONDANTS | | | | | |
|-------|--|---|---------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| | | | Thermoelectric | | | | | |
| 4 | Absolutely positive | | 12% Industry referente | | | | | |
| 3 | Strongly positive | As the parameter grows, the higher the incentive to | Small hydro | | | | | |
| 2 | Moderately positive | participation in auctions. (Driver) | 6% | | | | | |
| 1 | Minimally positive | (Driver) | | | | | | |
| 0 | Irrelevant or with very little impact | Very low relevance in decision making. | Wind | | | | | |
| -1 | Minimally negative | | 23% Portfo | | | | | |
| -2 | Moderately negative | As the parameter decreases, the higher the disincentive to | | | | | | |
| -3 | Strongly negative | participation in auctions. (Barrier) | Wind and Solar | | | | | |
| -4 | Absolutely negative | (Barrer) | Solar PV 6% | | | | | |

Results



| Project | Industry referents | | Portfolio | Thermoe | lectric | Wind. & S. PV | Wind | Solar PV | Mini Hydro | Average |
|-----------------|--------------------|--|-----------|---------|---------|------------------|------|----------|---------------|------------------|
| G1 | 34% | | 14% | 38% | | 30% | 63% | 33% | 33% | 30% |
| G2 | 30% | | 14% | 13% | | 11% | 55% | 16% | 17% | 20% |
| G3 | 28% | | 14% | 13% | | 11% | 30% | 23% | 17% | 18% |
| <mark>G4</mark> | 34% | | 57% | 38% | | <mark>48%</mark> | 53% | 28% | 33% | <mark>32%</mark> |
| F1 | 7% | | 1% | 7% | | 8% | 18% | 9% | 8% | 7% |
| F2 | 5% | | 3% | 7% | | 5% | 6% | 4% | 2% | 4% |
| F3 | 5% | | 3% | 9% | | 3% | 7% | 2% | 12% | 4% |
| F4 | 4% | | 1% | 4% | | 1% | 6% | 4% | 3% | 3% |
| F5 | 6% | | 3% | 4% | | 5% | 14% | 6% | 3% | 5% |
| F6 | 4% | | 3% | 6% | | 5% | 6% | 3% | 3% | 3% |
| F7 | 4% | | 3% | 2% | | 3% | 7% | 4% | 3% | 3% |
| F8 | 9% | | 4% | 3% | | 1% | 21% | 4% | 2% | 6% |
| F9 | 5% | | 4% | 3% | | 1% | 6% | 4% | 2% | 3% |
| F10 | 10% | | 4% | 5% | | 5% | 14% | 6% | 10% | 7% |
| F11 | 7% | | 4% | 3% | | 5% | 14% | 3% | 2% | 5% |
| F12 | 9% | | 5% | 5% | | 2% | 10% | 9% | 6% | 6% |
| F13 | 11% | | 5% | 6% | | 4% | 11% | 6% | 6% | 7% |
| F14 | 8% | | 5% | 3% | | 4% | 8% | 8% | 6% | 5% |
| F15 | 3% | | 8% | 7% | | 3% | 4% | 2% | 1% | 3% |
| F16 | 4% | | 8% | 3% | | 9% | 5% | 3% | 5% | 4% |
| F17 | 4% | | 8% | 2% | | 9% | 5% | 3% | 5% | 4% |
| F18 | 4% | | 8% | 2% | | 5% | 8% | 3% | 5% | 4% |
| F19 | 5% | | 8% | 5% | | 5% | 11% | 4% | 5% | 5% |
| F20 | 3% | | 8% | 4% | | 5% | 9% | 4% | 8% | 4% |
| F21 | 6% | | 4% | 7% | | 3% | 5% | 3% | 3% | 4% |
| 522 | F0/ | | 40/ | 00/ | | 00/ | C0/ | F0/ | 10/ | F0/ |



Discussion

- Initial results shows that changes in market reforms /conditions in general contributed more in attracting investment, causing at the same time, an increase in competition.
- The results show that the most relevant factors for solar PV are related to higher plant factor, the design of auction scheme, including the length of contracts, & the hourly supply blocks.



Discussion

- The very low prices have raised doubts about economic feasibility of awarded projects
- Guarantees pledged are rather insufficient to guarantee the realization of projects
- Other issues may come into play to archive energy matrix objectives:
 - Aging transmission infrastructure and congestion issues
 - Increasing conflict levels with local communities



¿Questions or Comments?

